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A re you one of those people who never shopson the Web for fear of fraud? Does thethought of online banking make you antsy?
Do you get nervous when talk of digital govern-
ment arises? If so, you’re not as paranoid as your
friends say — some of your concerns are indeed
well founded. With the rapid development of Web
technologies and applications built on these tech-
nologies, new security risks have emerged. Tradi-
tional security models do not provide adequate pro-
tection in this dynamic and open environment.
Fortunately, as we’ll discuss, significant efforts are
under way that should make Web services secure.
Securing the Enterprise
Nowadays, an individual still might be able to
avoid going online, but any company that wants
to compete in the global economy needs a Web
presence. That entails risks. To balance Internet
access needs with security concerns, the business
world needs technologies that provide security
with high assurance. 
Security leaks can cost a company its competi-
tive advantage, and leaks are rarely accidental.
Industrial espionage has been around for ages. In
the 16th century, for instance, Venetian merchants
used poison and bribery to gain market share. As
emerging Web services become preeminent in e-
commerce, advanced technologies, such as soft-
ware agents and ontologies, will allow more subtle
attacks. 
Security is not solely a problem for human
organizations. In a real scenario reminiscent of
the cartoon Spy vs. Spy, an assassin agent recent-
ly connected itself to the JADE (Java Agent
Development Framework) agent platform in Italy,
killing all of the agents it found there. Although
not as serious as it might appear — because the
agents in Italy were there for research purposes
— the episode nevertheless shows that agents
need security. As agents adopt more mission-
critical roles within enterprises, this concern will
grow in importance.
Web Services 
and the Semantic Web
The World Wide Web was designed for humans. The
envisioned Semantic Web is geared toward agents
as well. Semantic constructs — such as ontologies
represented in the DARPA Agent Markup Language
(DAML), the Resource Description Framework (RDF),
and XML — will let agents, as well as people, under-
stand a Web page’s content.1,2
The Semantic Web’s success will depend on the
implementation and use of Web services, which
will likely be agent-based in the future. Using
intelligent collaborations, agents can achieve glob-
al optimization while adapting to local require-
ments.3 This approach will let agents use the large
amount of information available over the Web —
a task that is beyond human processing power —
but this enhanced processing power can be a dou-
ble-edged sword. Because malicious users and
their agents can disclose sensitive information or
sabotage the information of others, agents and
supporting technologies need to be secure and reli-
able for safe Web services.
A Secure Semantic Web
Agent technologies were designed with a focus
on interoperability, distributed problem solving,
and cooperation. Multiagent systems were
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intended to be responsive to open
environments, such as the Internet, to
capitalize on cooperative interactions.
But this readiness to interact leaves
them vulnerable to agents with harm-
ful intentions. A malicious agent
could “kill” an agent that was respon-
sible for selling goods, for example,
and by pretend to be that agent, could
begin taking sales orders and accept-
ing payments. Such potential for
abuse has prompted recent efforts to




Safeguarding multiagent systems re-
quires the development of secure com-
munication protocols, access control
models for agents, methods for dele-
gating agent privileges, and distributed
trust management. In addition, agent
management systems and directory
services must be protected from being
compromised or destroyed. Developers
are securing agent platforms by pro-
viding mechanisms for authenticating
and authorizing individual agents and
platform components.4
The approach used with JADE is typ-
ical and interesting.5 It is principal-
based, meaning that it relies on Java
security policies and mechanisms for
human users. Because a JADE agent
platform can be distributed across sev-
eral hosts and can support the interac-
tions of autonomous entities, each
component must belong to some user
who is responsible for its actions.
Hence, a JADE platform must know all
users and be convinced of their authen-
tication. Figure 1 shows a multiuser
JADE scenario, which has two authen-
ticated owners for all components.
On this platform, each agent has an
identity certificate that is digitally
signed by a certification authority. The
certificate serves to unlock privileges
for the agent. Using a delegation mech-
anism, an agent can also borrow cre-
dentials from other agents to get per-
mission to perform other actions.
Signed delegation certificates validate
the additional credentials.
Such traditional user- and princi-
pal-based security systems are likely to
be insufficient to secure agent-based
systems. Agents can play different
roles in different platforms, dynami-
cally change their access requirements,
and act on behalf of users with differ-
ent access privileges. Without relying
on a centralized trust management
system, agents must be able to decide
whether or not to trust another agent
or platform. Policies must therefore be
developed that focus specifically on
agent environments.
Agent Security
Although security needs for multiagent
applications have drawn attention
recently, few applications deploy secu-
rity measures.3,6 Those that do focus
either on agent communications or the
needs of mobile agents,4,6 paying less
attention to secure multiagent plat-
forms, privilege propagation, and trust
management.
Clearly, communication with other
agents is a crucial aspect of agent exe-
cution and cooperation. Ensuring safe
execution first means providing con-
fidential and integrity-preserving
communication among the agents. 
The use of mobile agents poses two
fundamental security requirements: 
 Protecting an agent execution en-
vironment from a malicious agent.
 Protecting an agent from a mali-
cious platform.
Yet, the threat of agents being moni-
tored, tested on fake data, or supplied
with malicious code has not received
sufficient attention. Agents could eas-
ily be corrupted or destroyed, their
Web usage monitored and analyzed,
and their communications disclosed
and distorted. Researchers must devel-
op and implement techniques to eval-
uate multiagent platforms’ security
needs — such as authentication, access
control, and inferences — to mitigate
such threats. 
Stealth Attacks
It is not always necessary to compro-
mise a computer system to gain
access to unauthorized information.
In addition to making direct attacks,
a malicious user might associate and
correlate publicly available informa-
tion to deduce vulnerabilities and
secrets. Current Web technologies pri-
marily support human consumption,
thus limiting the power of data analy-
sis, but the support for interoperation
and machine-enabled information
processing increases the danger. Intel-
ligent agents, enabled to access and
process large amounts of Web data,
will be able to discover information
that might be confidential.
Consider a scenario in which a
water treatment facility wants to keep
its maintenance schedule inaccessible
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Container 1 Container 2
Figure 1. Multiuser JADE security scenario. User Pat owns the main container,
two of its agents, and one of the agents in Container-2. User Sam owns the
other containers and agents.The users must be authenticated on the JADE
platform by providing a valid username and password.A JADE policy, along
with the permissions of the owners, determines which actions the agents can
perform.
to the public to prevent tampering. In
the same region, a high school student
is performing research for a science
fair project. To test her hypothesis that
maintenance of the water reservoir
affects water quality, she takes water
samples from the area and uses the
water treatment facility’s laboratory to
analyze the samples. Her results and
the descriptions of her experiments,
including the sample time and treat-
ment, are posted on her Web site,
enabling the facility’s schedule to be
deduced. 
Such security breeches might not
always be obvious to people, because
different sites might use different
vocabularies to describe their informa-
tion, but agents with ontology trans-
lation capabilities might be able to
infer disallowed information. To en-
sure secure Semantic Web applications,
the research community will need to
provide answers to:
 How can we measure the security
of a Web-based information sys-
tem?
 How can we assess the security
threat from large-scale, distributed
Web inferences?
 What are the fundamental differ-
ences between securing software
agents and securing human users? 
 What inferences can a malicious
user make by observing an agent’s
responses or monitoring an agent’s
Web usage? 
 How can agents make decisions on
the trustworthiness of Web sites
and other agents, and detect prob-
ing attacks? 
 How can access to ontologies be
controlled to prevent undesired
inferences while supporting agents’
cooperation?
Although indirect attacks might not
be as obvious as “killing” an agent,
the consequences can be just as seri-
ous. Silently monitoring an organi-
zation’s marketing agents might
enable its competition to steal cus-
tomers and gain market share. Ad-
dressing both direct and indirect
attacks on agents and their platforms




To provide security for (Semantic) Web
services, security models and tools for
the underlying technologies, such as
XML, RDF, DAML-OIL, need to be de-
veloped. Security requirements for
multiagent systems are driven by func-
tionality, collaboration, and organiza-
tional needs. A policy language to
express security requirements and tech-
niques to enforce the policy at the level
of supporting technologies need to be
developed. 
Ongoing research efforts address
the problem of controlling access to
XML data: Industry experts focus
mainly on developing technologies to
enforce security restrictions, such as
XML signatures and encryption,
while academic researchers develop
design principles and access-control
models.7,8
The Organization for Advancement
of Structured Information Standards
(www.oasis-open.org) is defining the
XML-based Security Assertion Markup
Language, for example, to standardize
the exchange of authentication and
authorization information. One of the
major design goals with SAML is sin-
gle sign-on — the ability of a user to
authenticate in one domain and use
resources in other domains without
reauthenticating. This standard will be
an important protocol for agents as
they engage and interact with re-
sources and other agents in various
domains. With it, a security adminis-
trator can express advanced security
requirements, such as time- or event-
based restrictions. 
Access Control
Access control forms the first line of
defense against misuse. We need flex-
ible models for Web access control
that support fine-grained data granu-
larity, accommodate a wide range of
policies, are suitable for dynamic,
decentralized, and open environments,
and are scalable. In addition, they
must preserve the semantic consisten-
cy of data and limit illegal inferences.
Current techniques address some of
these concerns, but no full solution is
yet available. 
For example, some of the XML ac-
cess control models require that sensi-
tivity of data items increase downward
in an XML tree. Users can be prevent-
ed from seeing the lower nodes of the
tree. While this model might be en-
forceable during the design of a new
XML document, it might not be applic-
able to existing ones. 
Other models, which allow mixed
sensitivity along a path in the XML
document — for example, a low-
sensitivity tag might be under a high-
sensitivity tag — provide confiden-
tiality by not releasing the value of
the sensitive tags. They either release
“blank” values as place holders for
the real values, or delete the sensitive
tags and values and link the lower-
level tags to their nearest permitted
tag. The first solution creates an
inference channel, allowing an unau-
thorized user to infer the existence of
a disallowed data item. The second
solution does not reveal the existence
of the data item, but might violate
semantic consistency of the tags that
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Addressing both direct and indirect attacks on
agents and their platforms is crucial to providing
a secure Web environment.
were originally linked to the disal-
lowed tags. 
The Inference Problem
Access-control models focus on
security requirements of direct data
accesses. However, they fail to
address indirect accesses based on
the underlying data semantics. While
several research papers and proto-
types explore the problem of RDF
inferences, none considers the possi-
ble security implications, let alone
recommends ways to safeguard sen-
sitive information.
The inference problem, as defined by
database researchers, is where sensitive
information is disclosed by combining
nonsensitive data with metadata (such
as database dependencies and integrity
constraints). Its avoidance lies in how
to express a user’s knowledge (metada-
ta) and how to trace possible collabo-
rations among malicious users. 
Development of the Semantic Web
reopens the inference problem from a
new perspective. We can hardly as-
sume that the Web user — or even the
person whose data is stored on the
Web — knows all available informa-
tion. Sensitive data about users could
quite possibly be available at a site
unknown to them. 
In one of our favorite homework
assignments, for example, we ask stu-
dents to find a professor’s home phone
number, which is listed under a differ-
ent name in the local telephone direc-
tory. The number is not posted any-
where, and all listings on the Web have
been tracked to ensure that the number
is confidential. By combining informa-
tion about the professor’s other family
members, however, students eventual-
ly can infer the correct number.
In a Web environment, it is difficult
to detect data replication with incon-
sistent security classifications. It is
even more difficult when the use of
ontologies makes it possible to find
related data stored at other sites.
Ontologies also support semantic cor-
relation between related data to derive
new information (similar to tradition-
al database inferences in an open
environment). The derived informa-
tion might be sensitive and should not
be derivable from released, nonsensi-
tive data.
Conclusions
Agents were designed to collaborate
and share information. While highly
desirable for interoperability, this
feature is scary from the security per-
spective. Illegal inferences, support-
ed by Semantic Web technology and
ontologies, might enable users to
access unauthorized information. In
addition to semantic associations and
replicated data with different sensi-
tivity, malicious agents could also
exploit statistical inferences. Al-
though each agent in a system might
behave in a desired and secure way,
their combined knowledge could be
used to disclose sensitive data. The
research community must therefore
develop and implement techniques
that allow control over released data. 
To answer the questions related to
information availability (scalability),
data correctness (integrity), and access
control in the presence of illegal infer-
ences and undesired collaborations
(confidentiality), researchers in Sem-
antic Web technologies (XML, RDF,
DAML, and multiagent systems) and
information system security need to
collaborate. Indeed, given the Web’s
openness, dynamic nature, and diverse
user population, developing secure
Web services will require the collabo-
ration of experts in different fields
from both industry and academia. In
turn, the “Intelligent Web” of the
future will facilitate unheard-of sup-
port for collaborations and informa-
tion management.
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The research community must develop and
implement techniques that allow control over
released data.
